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CIVIL SOCIETY AND CYBERSURVEILLANCE
Andrew McCanse Wright *

I. INTRODUCTION
There is no such thing as benign surveillance. 1 It always
comes with costs because of the chill it visits upon conduct,
education, associations, and expression. 2
Government
surveillance has been magnified by cybersurveillance 3 in the
Digital Age 4 to a degree unimaginable by the Founders of the
United States of America. 5 The various National Security
*
Associate Professor, Savannah Law School. I wrote this essay for presentation at the
Cybersurveillance Discussion Forum held at the Université Paris-Dauphine. I am grateful
and indebted to Russ Weaver and the other Forum hosts and participants. I would also like
to thank Vinay Harpalani, Ron Krotoszynski, Caprice Roberts, and Gary Wright for their
thoughtful comments on earlier drafts. Finally, Erica Drew, Katelyn Ashton, and Meagan
Rafferty provided invaluable research and editorial support.
1. Surveillance is commonly associated with law enforcement. See, e.g., Surveillance,
CAMBRIDGE ACADEMIC CONTENT DICTIONARY (1st ed. 2009) (defining “surveillance” as
“the act of watching a person or a place, especially a person believed to be involved with
criminal activity or a place where criminals gather”). While that connotation has relevance
to this essay, I use “surveillance” to refer to “the gathering and analysis of information in the
pursuit of various finalities—in particular, preventing certain risks, orienting human
behaviors and, in the event of a problem, locating the persons responsible.” Monica
Tremblay, Cyber-Surveillance, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION (L. Côté & J.-F. Savard eds., online ed. 2012),
http://www.dictionnaire.enap.ca/dictionnaire/docs/definitions/definitions_anglais/cyber_sur
veillance.pdf [https://perma.cc/62YN-QUM5]; see also DAVID LYON, SURVEILLANCE
STUDIES: AN OVERVIEW 14 (2007) (defining surveillance as “the focused, systematic and
routine attention to personal details for purposes of influence, management, protection or
direction”).
2. Surveillance provides public and private benefits as well, but the fact that
observation affects those aware of its potential is manifest. See infra Part V.
3. I use the term “cybersurveillance” as defined in the Encyclopedic Dictionary of
Public Administration because it encompasses technical platforms beyond the Internet: “a
mechanism for the surveillance of persons, objects or processes that is based on new
technologies and that is operated from and on data networks, such as the Internet.”
Tremblay, supra note 1.
4. I refer to the “Digital Age,” also called the Information Age, as the time period
starting in the 1970s and defined by the introduction of the personal computer and subsequent
technology that allows the rapid and massive storage and transfer of information in digital
form. See Digital Age, CAMBRIDGE BUSINESS ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2011).
5. While some of these observations would apply to the European Union, the
Commonwealth, and other comparative contexts, I address these questions through the lens
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Agency (NSA) telephone and internet surveillance programs that
have come to light 6 shocked the public as a matter of scale and
audacity. 7 There has also been a raging debate about government
access to counter-surveillance encryption technology. 8
However, the entry of government cybersurveillance into the
daily routines of life may pose an even greater concern. The
unfolding technological revolution profoundly alters human
relations to governments, business entities, civic institutions, and
social associations. 9 As the world becomes more interconnected,
national security threats can grow domestically, cross physical
borders, or emanate from digital space itself. 10 At the same time,
government surveillance-capacity expansion has been
geometric. 11 All of these developments threaten private spaces

of the American constitutional system.
6. See LUKE HARDING, THE SNOWDEN FILES: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE WORLD’S
MOST WANTED MAN 10-11 (2014); Dustin Volz, Everything We Learned from Edward
Snowden in 2013, NAT’L J. (Dec. 31, 2013). For a pre-Snowden perspective, see Neal Katyal
& Richard Caplan, The Surprisingly Stronger Case for the Legality of the NSA Surveillance
Program: The FDR Precedent, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1023, 1032-35 (2008) (outlining public
reporting about the NSA surveillance program).
7. As the invitation to the 2016 Privacy Forum indicates: “[T]he size of the NSA
surveillance and collection program was absolutely staggering, with the NSA spending some
$10.8 billion per year and maintaining a staff of some 35,000 employees.” Russel L. Weaver
& Laurence Boissier, Governmental Transparency and Openness in a Digital Era: A U.S.
Perspective, 2 INT’L J. DIGITAL & DATA L. 59, 69 (2016) (footnotes omitted) (discussing
the government’s large cybersurveillance operation and how if not for Edward Snowden
“the American people might never have known about [its] size”).
8. Compare James B. Comey, Director, Fed. Bureau Investigation, Going Dark: Are
Technology, Privacy, and Public Safety on a Collision Course?, Remarks at the Brookings
Institution (Oct. 16, 2014), https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/going-dark-are-technologyprivacy-and-public-safety-on-a-collision-course [https://perma.cc/4GS9-2WEG] (arguing to
extend to emerging technologies those legal requirements for telecommunications carriers
and broadband providers to build interception capabilities into their networks for courtordered surveillance), with Rob Price, Tim Cook’s Internal Memo to All Apple Employees on
the Company’s Fight Against the FBI, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 22, 2016, 7:14 AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/tim-cook-apple-fbi-hack-iphone-san-bernardino-memo2016-2 [https://perma.cc/5ECL-H6VX] (thanking employees for supporting Apple’s
opposition to the FBI’s request to order a workaround of the encryption on the San
Bernardino terrorism suspect’s iPhones because “we use encryption to protect our
customers—whose data is under siege”).
9. See infra Part VI.
10. KRISTIN FINKLEA & CATHERINE A. THEOHARY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REP.
NO. R42547, CYBERCRIME: CONCEPTUAL ISSUES FOR CONGRESS AND U.S. LAW
ENFORCEMENT 8 (2015).
11. See infra Part VI.
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and modes that are essential to self-government. 12
In this essay, I argue that it would be productive to reverse
prevailing thought about privacy and government surveillance.
Traditional legal analysis calls on courts and policy makers to
look to specific provisions of governmental charters and laws to
address the permissibility of a particular government surveillance
effort. 13 Rather, courts and policy makers would benefit from
assessing the freedom from surveillance required to preserve an
empowered democratic citizenry and working backwards to
assess whether a particular government surveillance effort stifles
that freedom.
The United States was established as a liberal democratic
republic. 14 One of the essential features of the American political
scheme is a civil society, which presupposes “a social sphere
separate from both the state and the market.” 15 It requires
apartness from the government. That separation from the
government, which I will call the civil preserve, 16 is a necessary
feature for both legitimate government (i.e., the consent of the
governed) as well as democratic self-government (i.e.,
empowered citizens). Beyond the sequential approach of classic
Fourth Amendment analysis, 17 civil society theory raises other

12. See Daniel J. Solove, Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1264, 1267-68 (2004).
13. Id. at 1267, 1269-76.
14. See PERRY KELLY, EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL MEDIA LAW: LIBERAL
DEMOCRACY, TRADE, AND THE NEW MEDIA 57 (2011) (describing the “early American start
as an avowedly liberal democratic republic”). The United States is “liberal” in that it protects
civil liberties and political freedom by means of the rule of law and constitutional limitation,
“democratic” in that American citizens elect their leaders, and “republican” in that policy
decisions are primarily made by elected leaders. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, A
MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985).
15. ALISON MACK ET AL., NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., GLOBAL HEALTH
RISK FRAMEWORK: GOVERNANCE FOR GLOBAL HEALTH: WORKSHOP SUMMARY 112
(2016). For a more fulsome discussion of various definitions and underpinnings of civil
society theory, see Benny D. Setianto, Somewhere in Between: Conceptualizing Civil
Society, 10 INT’L J. OF NOT-FOR-PROFIT L. 109, 110, 113-17 (2007).
16. The term “civil preserve” has been used to denote the area of authority held
exclusively by the President of the United States in relation to subordinate military
commanders. See, e.g., JAMES A. RAWLEY, TURNING POINTS OF THE CIVIL WAR 173-74
(New Bison Books ed., Univ. of Neb. Press 1989) (1966) (describing politics as part of “the
civil preserve of the President, not to be poached on by a general”). I appropriate the term
as used differently in this essay but adopt the concept of an area not to be encroached upon.
17. See Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L.
REV. 311, 315-16 (2012) (“The sequential approach is not merely a minor aspect of Fourth
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fundamental questions. 18 What kind of citizen do we need? What
zone of autonomy is necessary to build that kind of citizen? In a
more aggregate sense, what space is required to create private
associations that build the political culture necessary for
government by the people?
Benjamin Franklin famously wrote: “Those who would give
up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve
neither Liberty nor Safety.” 19 The civil preserve consists of
essential liberty and privacy. Protection of the civil preserve
should be the paramount limitation on public interests in
cybersurveillance as a means of countering criminal activity and
national security threats. At first blush, the civil preserve does
not readily lend itself to practical judicial processes. But an
understanding of its essence, attributes, and limitations should be
a central concern to academics, policy makers, and judges.

II. CIVIL SOCIETY THEORY
Civil society is a defining feature of the American liberal
democratic republic. 20 In one sense, the American system can be
defined in the negative. The theory divides the world into public
and private spaces, with a “society” in the middle that mediates
between the public and private spheres. As one commentator
notes:
[C]ivil society denotes those collectivities, or those
collective actions and norms, which are outside of and
autonomous from the state, being also neither the property
of the ‘private sphere’ (of family life) or of the economy
(whether or not the economy is defined as ‘private’). Civil
Amendment doctrine. Rather, it forms the foundation of existing search and seizure
analysis.”).
18. See infra Part II.
19. CARLA J. MULFORD, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN AND THE ENDS OF EMPIRE 178 (2015)
(observing that Franklin’s quotation “has consonance with some of the most important
articulations about liberty and governance in early modern liberal expression”). But see
Benjamin Wittes, What Ben Franklin Really Said, LAWFARE (July 15, 2011,
6:53 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/what-ben-franklin-really-said#.UvvR12RDtZs
[https://perma.cc/6H43-QRTL] (“In other words, the ‘essential liberty’ to which Franklin
referred was thus not what we would think of today as civil liberties but, rather, the right of
self-governance of a legislature in the interests of collective security.”).
20. Gideon B. Baker, Civil Society and Democratisation Theory: An Inter-Regional
Comparison 1 (Sept. 1998) (unpublished D. Phil. dissertation, University of Leeds),
https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/43716.pdf [https://perma.cc/9KE2-4ARE].
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society is therefore at once public and private—‘public’ in
the sense that human association always has implications for
the wider community, placing an individual in a particular
relation to others and to the whole; and ‘private’ in that it
falls outside of the formal political sphere where publicly
binding decisions are made. Of course, both the family and
the economy also posses [sic] these characteristics, yet civil
society is defined apart from these constructs because it is in
some ways (or ideally) a realm of voluntary association. 21

It is in this sense that a “society” dwells in that middle space.
These voluntary associations are mediating institutions upon
which the broader American political system relies. 22 Mediating
institutions help create the attributes necessary for democratic
citizenship.23
The space reserved for people apart from government is
apparent when compared to the totalitarian theory 24 of
Communism guiding the Democratic People’s Republic of

21. Id. at 20; see also Michael W. Foley & Bob Edwards, Beyond Tocqueville: Civil
Society and Social Capital in Comparative Perspective, 42 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 5,
6 (1998) (tracing the modern usage of the term “civil society” to “the 18th-century effort to
wrest a social space within which emerging and preexisting types of associations could
pursue their own ends relatively free from the absolutizing pretensions of both monarchists
and radical republicans”).
22. See Steven G. Calabresi, Political Parties as Mediating Institutions, 61 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1479, 1490 (1994) (characterizing synagogues, churches, temples, families, and
voluntary community and civic associations as “mediating institutions [that] may truly
mediate between the private individual and the state”) (citing ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 1
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 310-34 (Henry Reeve, trans., Vintage Books 1945) (1835)).
23. See Foley & Edwards, supra note 21, at 11-12 (theorizing that civil society’s
mediating institutions perform socialization functions, quasi-public functions, and
representative functions for civic culture).
24. A totalitarian government recognizes no limits to its power and no autonomy in its
populace. It claims not just a monopoly on political power, but the regulation of all cultural,
religious, and economic elements of society. Giovanni Amendola first articulated “total”
state power as a description of Italian Fascism. See RICHARD PIPES, RUSSIA UNDER THE
BOLSHEVIK REGIME 243 (1993). On his path to Nazism, a Weimar Republic jurist coined
the term Totalstaat. See CARL SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL 22 (George
Schwab trans., Rutgers Univ. Press 1976) (1932); see also HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS
OF TOTALITARIANISM 307-11 (new ed. 1973) (describing ideology as the engine and
organizing principle of the totalitarian regime).
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Korea 25 or the theocracy model 26 aspired to by the Islamic
Republic of Iran. 27 The United States was formed on a theory of
consent of the governed rather than a claim of divine mandate. 28
America’s Founders radically departed from the ancien régime by
conferring government legitimacy by means of a voting
franchise. 29 Since that time, the United States has extended those
rights, albeit fitfully, to freedmen, people who could not afford a

25. Changyong Choi, “Everyday Politics” in North Korea, 72 J. ASIAN STUD. 655,
656 (2013) (“Many studies have focused on North Korea as a socialist state and the fact that
its political system is based on highly structured totalitarianism, where collective rules and
political and ideological solidarity are emphasized over individual activities.”) (citations
omitted).
26. In a theocracy, “God is recognized as the immediate ruler and His laws are taken
as the legal code of the community and are expounded and administered by holy men as His
agents.” S.E.F., Theocracy, in THE BLACKWELL ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF POLITICAL
INSTITUTIONS 610 (Vernon Bogdanor ed., 1987). A theocracy can be defined as a totalitarian
state in which the governing ideology is the concept of one true religion that regulates
political, cultural, and economic elements of society. See Mario Ferrero, The Rise and
Demise of Theocracy: Theory and Some Evidence, 156 PUB. CHOICE 723, 723-24
(2013)(“Theocracy literally means government by God . . . . [T]he word in its strict sense is
usually understood to mean government by a clergy, or a self-appointed group who claim to
speak and act on God’s behalf.”).
27. See H. E. Chehabi, Religion and Politics in Iran: How Theocratic is the Islamic
Republic?, 120 DAEDALUS 69, 72-74 (1991) (detailing Ayatollah Khameini’s fitful
revolution project to subsume Iran’s political, legal, social and economic life under the
theocratic control of clerics). Iran’s political regime is particularly complicated, with
multiple power centers and some democratic processes that dilute the Ayatollah’s theocratic
claims. See Stephen C. Fairbanks, Theocracy Versus Democracy: Iran Considers Political
Parties, 52 MIDDLE EAST J. 17, 31 (1998) (“Khatami’s 20 million voters ushered in a
principle of people’s government and a demand for the institutions of civil society. Those
ideas are difficult to reconcile with theocracy . . . .”).
28. U.S. CONST. pmbl. (declaring “We the People . . . ordain[ed] and establish[ed]”
the U.S. Constitution). “The first three words of the preamble to the Constitution suggest
one element unique to the American Revolution: its outcome was a government created by
the people, not one existing independently of them . . . .” Donald L. Doernberg, “We the
People”: John Locke, Collective Constitutional Rights, and Standing to Challenge
Government Action, 73 CAL. L. REV. 52, 52 (1985) (footnote omitted); see also JOHN
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 118-23 (Belknap Press rev. ed. 1999) (1971) (arguing the
legitimacy of a social contract depends on free and rational choice by all individuals in the
original position, in which each person’s preferences are separated by a “veil of ignorance”);
Michel Rosenfeld, Contract and Justice: The Relation Between Classical Contract Law and
Social Contract Theory, 70 IOWA L. REV. 769, 847-80 (1985) (summarizing the various
social contract theories of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean Jacque Rousseau, and
Immanuel Kant that a social contract is a set of collectively binding social arrangements
predicated on consent of those governed by it).
29. See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 8-9 (2000).
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poll tax, women, and those eighteen years old. 30 Notwithstanding
more recent conservative efforts to curtail ballot access 31 and
uneven Supreme Court election law jurisprudence, 32 voting
remains central to the legitimacy of American government.
The American model requires a dedicated private sphere and
a robust civil society. A civil preserve is essential to create the
space necessary to participate in mediating institutions and
maintain the tools of self-government. However, the ruthless
efficiency and expansion of cybersurveillance often intrudes upon
behavior reflecting private conscience and voluntary
association. 33

III. THE CIVIL PRESERVE
A civil preserve is defined by the privacy and liberty that
allow for autonomy required of citizens in a system of selfgovernment. Citizens in a liberal democratic republic have
governing responsibilities. 34 Formally, they may vote, petition
the government, determine probable cause, and find legal facts. 35
However, a polity must create the conditions necessary for a
30. See Kenneth T. Walsh, Voting Rights Still a Hot-Button Issue, U.S. NEWS (Aug.
4, 2015, 12:01 AM), https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/08/04/voting-rights-stilla-political-issue-50-years-later [https://perma.cc/PL5N-995u].
31. See William D. Hicks et al., A Principle or a Strategy? Voter Identification Laws
and Partisan Competition in the American States, 68 POL. RES. Q. 18, 19-21 (2015) (finding
that Republican-controlled legislatures strongly influence the adoption of voter identification
laws in electorally competitive states as a partisan countermeasure to a demographically
declining electoral coalition); see also Ari Berman, The GOP War on Voting, ROLLING
STONE (Aug. 30, 2011), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-gop-war-on-voting20110830 [https://perma.cc/C5U5-4Z4K] (discussing efforts by prominent conservatives,
including Paul Weyrich, David Koch, Charles Koch, to push election reforms that restrict
voter access for partisan gain).
32. Joshua A. Douglas, A Pivotal Moment for Election Law, 104 KY. L.J. 547, 559
(2016) (“Reforming the Court’s election law jurisprudence could result in a better
functioning democratic process; entrenching or extending harmful precedents will impede
that goal.”).
33. See, e.g., People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009) (“Disclosed in
[GPS] data . . . will be trips the indisputably private nature of which takes little imagination
to conjure: trips to the psychiatrist, the plastic surgeon, the abortion clinic, the AIDS
treatment center, the strip club, the criminal defense attorney, the by-the-hour motel, the
union meeting, the mosque, synagogue or church, the gay bar and on and on.”).
34. Citizenship Rights and Responsibilities, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION
SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/citizenship/learners/citizenship-rights-and-responsibilities
[https://perma.cc/XVX7-V5KB].
35. Id.
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populace to effectively fulfill those formal functions.
Much has been written about the process of citizen creation
since Alexis de Tocqueville published his findings in Democracy
in America, 36 including the importance of mediating institutions
and the role of enlightened self-interest. 37 These are the building
blocks of the American system, and they rely on autonomous and
empowered citizens. Citizens need to educate themselves about
issues because it is critical for citizens to cast votes on matters of
public importance. The populace needs space to develop private
conscience and public virtues. Citizens need to be able to
inculcate those values in their children and charges. They must
rely on a free flow of information in a marketplace of ideas that
sits apart from government-issued messages. There must be room
for brainstorms and dissent. In order to organize politically,
people need freedom to associate and build coalitions. They need
to be able to communicate messages that contradict, and even
disdain, government policy. At the same time, citizens must
observe the rule of law and develop a healthy respect for
government authority. They respect authority by adhering to the
rule of law in deference to its legitimacy. 38 In sum, citizens need
to be legally obedient but politically and culturally autonomous.
The civil preserve is analogous to the zone of branch
autonomy required to perform essential functions that are the
touchstone of a functionalist’s approach to separation of
powers. 39 The civil preserve constitutes the autonomous zone for

36. See generally ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (J.P. Mayer
& Max Lerner eds., George Lawrence, trans., Harper & Row 1966) (1835).
37. Tocqueville believed American participation in voluntary associations organized
around common interests or political issues created an enlightened self-interest. He argued
they had a transformational effect: “At first it is of necessity that men attend to the public
interest, afterward by choice. What had been calculation becomes instinct. By dint of
working for the good of his fellow citizens, he in the end acquires a habit and taste for serving
them.” Id. at 484.
38. See generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2006) (emphasizing
empirical evidence that legitimacy, when compared to deterrence, is a salient motivator of
law obedience).
39. See, e.g., M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of
Powers Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 603, 611 (2001) (noting the view that “the flexibility . . .
evaporates if the arrangement threatens ‘core’ functions”); Peter L. Strauss, Formal and
Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions—A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 488, 489 (1987) (observing “a functional approach . . . stresses core
function and relationship, and permits a good deal of flexibility when these attributes are not
threatened”).
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which intrusion stifles the core functions of citizenship. Thus,
privacy is both an end and a means. 40 Some degree of privacy is
a basic human right. 41 But preservation of a private sphere is also
an essential ingredient in democracy. 42 In his book, Privacy
Revisited, Professor Ronald Krotoszynksi makes compelling
observations about the essential relation between democracy and
privacy. 43
Without unsurveilled spaces for thoughts,
associations, and communications, the people lose their
deliberative capacity and institutional independence.
How much privacy do we need to create the apartness
necessary to create democratic stewardship of the state rather than
subservience to it? It is a vexing question that is not readily
susceptible to judicial standards. However, that does not mean
the civil preserve is wholly unknowable. While the civil preserve
is not a formal part of American constitutional doctrine, U.S.
Supreme Court opinions occasionally reference interests that are
features of it. 44 Moreover, while the Bill of Rights and Civil War
amendments provide a great deal of protection for the civil
preserve, they are distinct and not coextensive with it.

IV. THE CIVIL PRESERVE AND THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION
The choice to establish the United States as a liberal
democratic republic sounding in civil society and ordered liberty
contemplates the civil preserve. Perhaps the civil preserve is
included among natural rights and therefore preexisted the
40. For a thoughtful treatment of the bundle of concepts associated with privacy, see
DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 1 (2008). As David Pozen notes, privacy
interests not only clash with public interests, but also often sit in dynamic tension with other
privacy interests. See David E. Pozen, Privacy-Privacy Tradeoffs, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 221,
221-24 (2016) (citations omitted).
41. James Griffin, The Human Right to Privacy, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 697, 700
(2007) (“Without privacy, autonomy is threatened.”).
42. See Edward F. Ryan, Privacy, Orthodoxy and Democracy, 51 CAN. B. REV. 84, 85
(1973).
43. RONALD J. KROTOSZYNKSI, JR., PRIVACY REVISITED: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE
ON THE RIGHT TO BE LEFT ALONE 175 (2016) (“If speech is integral to democracy and, in
turn, privacy in the form of intellectual freedom is integral to speech, then privacy constitutes
a necessary condition for the maintenance of democratic self-government.”).
44. See generally United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (analyzing Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence and finding that Government committed an unlawful search when
it attached a tracking device to Jones’s car).
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Constitution. After all, the American legal canon begins with the
Declaration of Independence’s “self-evident” truth that people are
“endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights . . . .” 45
Perhaps the civil preserve was implied by the scheme created
when “We the People of the United States” ordained and
established the Constitution. 46 Maybe the civil preserve is among
those rights the Ninth Amendment reminds us are “retained by
the people.” 47 As Justice Goldberg concluded in his Griswold v.
Connecticut 48 concurring opinion, “[t]he language and history of
the Ninth Amendment reveal that the Framers of the Constitution
believed that there are additional fundamental rights, protected
from governmental infringement, which exist alongside those
fundamental rights specifically mentioned in the first eight
constitutional amendments.” 49 Under any of these authorities, a
civil preserve is a priori to the Bill of Rights. 50
It is one thing to acknowledge the existence and significance
of a civil preserve. It is quite another to provide meaningful
standards cognizable to legal processes operating in the real
world. 51 For the most part, the text and legal doctrine of specific
constitutional provisions will do the work. However, there are
areas in which structural limitations and the Bill of Rights may be
insufficient. Such potentialities are magnified in the context of
cybersurveillance in the Digital Age. 52
Originally, the Federalist Founders opposed the need for a
Bill of Rights. In part, they believed the democratic process
45. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
46. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
47. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
48. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
49. Id. at 488 (Goldberg, J., concurring); see also Louis Michael Seidman, Our
Unsettled Ninth Amendment: An Essay on Unenumerated Rights and the Impossibility of
Textualism, 98 CAL. L. REV. 2129, 2140 (2010) (“Although [the Ninth Amendment’s] scope
was limited to the federal government, its intention and effect were to protect individual
rights within that scope.”). But see Russell L. Caplan, The History and Meaning of the Ninth
Amendment, 69 VA. L. REV. 223, 228 (1983) (arguing that the Ninth Amendment “neither
creates new rights nor alters the status of pre-existing rights” but rather “provides that the
individual rights contained in state law are to continue in force under the Constitution until
modified or eliminated . . . .”); see also id. at 243 (stating “[u]nenumerated rights were not
federal rights”).
50. See U.S. CONST. amends. I-X.
51. “The varieties and uncertainties of definition, of course, trouble also attempts to
locate privacy in law.” Louis Henken, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410,
1419 (1974).
52. See infra Part VI.
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would safeguard liberty and privacy interests. 53 Additionally,
they believed the structural limitations established by a system of
separated powers and federalism would limit the federal
encroachment on those essential citizen functions, 54 here defined
as the civil preserve. However, the politics of national security
and the technological pressures of the Digital Age do not seem to
be halting the massive expansion of cybersurveillance vis-à-vis
the civil preserve. 55
Of course, the Bill of Rights, as extended by the Civil War
Amendments, establishes civil liberties that protect aspects of the
civil preserve in both rationale and function. 56 The First
(expressive, associational, and religious freedom), Third (soldierquartering prohibition), Fourth (search and seizure protections),
Fifth (substantive due process and self-incrimination prohibition),
Eighth (punishment limitations), and Fourteenth (due process and
incorporation of other provisions to states) Amendments all
contain limitations on government power that, collectively, help
protect the integrity of the civil preserve. 57 However, the civil
preserve is inadequately protected by the sum of these
constitutional provisions. The daylight between constitutional
provisions and the civil preserve is only exacerbated by Big Data
in the Digital Age.
The Fourth Amendment is the natural and primary locus of
legal challenges to government cybersurveillance. In the seminal
case, Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court articulated the
Fourth Amendment’s reasonable expectation of privacy
standard. 58 One of the big problems with American constitutional
law regarding the Fourth Amendment is the vulnerability of its
reasonable expectation of privacy formulation to a descriptive
rather than normative approach. Ever since Katz, courts have
53. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing a bill of rights has
“no application to constitutions professedly founded upon the power of the people, and
executed by their immediate representatives and servants”).
54. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 5
(5th ed. 2015) (noting that some attribute the absence of an “elaborate statement of individual
rights in the Constitution” as originally ratified was due to the framers believing it was
“unnecessary because rights were adequately protected by the limitations on power of the
national government.”).
55. See infra Part VI.
56. See U.S. CONST. amends. I-X.
57. See id.
58. 389 U.S. 347, 360-62 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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struggled with the subjective and objective components of a
reasonable expectation of privacy that society will recognize. 59 If
one were to ask millennial law students whether they believe all
their emails and social media are being monitored, many would
say “probably.” Those diminished privacy expectations are not
unfounded. 60 A descriptive view of reasonableness would
suggest that the reality of surveillance shrinks society’s Fourth
Amendment expectations.
Civil society theory counsels for a Fourth Amendment with
normative content grounded in democratic notions of ordered
liberty. 61 While the Fourth Amendment surely applies to privacy
interests beyond those essential for civil society, the
reasonableness of one’s expectation of privacy must be made in
reference to whether the government intrusion pierces the civil
preserve. Under this view, Fourth Amendment protections do not
constrict based on real world experience or technological
capacity, but rather the civil preserve acts as a halo around the
citizen that maintains its integrity in each new technological
context.
The third-party doctrine vastly expands the reach of
government cybersurveillance in the Digital Age. 62 Human
interaction with technology is becoming ever more dynamic and

59. Russell L. Weaver, The Fourth Amendment and Technologically Based
Surveillance, 48 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 231, 237 (2015) (“Although the Court has rendered some
post-Katz technology decisions that are privacy protective, the general thrust of the Court’s
jurisprudence has been largely unproductive.”).
60. See, e.g., United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 426-29 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc)
(holding that obtaining historical-cell-site-location information from a Defendant’s cellphone provider was not a Fourth Amendment search under the third-party doctrine); United
States v. De L’Isle, 825 F.3d 426, 433 (8th Cir. 2016) (holding police review of magneticstrip information from the back of credit card does not constitute a Fourth Amendment
search); Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment in a World Without Privacy, 81 MISS. L.J. 1309,
1313-19 (2012) (outlining the “Death of Privacy” under the headings “The One Device,”
“The Cloud,” “The Social,” “Big Data,” and “The Surveillance Society”). Ellen Nakashima,
FBI Wants Access to Internet Browser History Without a Warrant in Terrorism and Spy
Cases, WASH. POST (June 6, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ world/nationalsecurity/fbi-wants-access-to-internet-browser-history-without-a-warrant-in-terrorism-andspy-cases/2016/06/06/2d257328-2c0d-11e6-9de3-6e6e7a14000c_story.html?utm_term=.
a009579c170a [https://perma.cc/28Q2-7CSQ].
61. See generally Thomas P. Crocker, The Political Fourth Amendment, 88 WASH. U.
L. REV. 303 (2010) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment, rather than merely a criminal
procedure regulation, is designed to protect political liberty).
62. See RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REP. NO. R43586, THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE 7 (2014).
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central. 63 Convenience and sales discounts create incentives for
people to provide massive amounts of information to businesses
and service providers. 64 In turn, those entities create enormous
commercial databanks that enable them to store, sell, and trade
customer information. 65
Third-party doctrine allows the
government to obtain all of that information without a warrant.
While customers may “voluntarily” provide commercial entities
with personal information, it is unlikely they consider whether
that information will be provided to the government without
giving them an opportunity to object. Under prevailing Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, a person does not have an enforceable
privacy interest in information provided to third-party vendors. 66
Concerns about cybersurveillance in the Digital Age motivated
Justice Sotomayor to suggest that “it may be necessary to
reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to
third parties.” 67 Narrowing the third-party doctrine to construe
government collection of nonpublic commercial transaction data
as searches requiring warrants supported by probable cause would
add prophylaxis for the civil preserve. 68
63. See Ray Kurzweil, The Law of Accelerating Returns, KURZWEIL ACCELERATING
INTELLIGENCE (Mar. 7, 2001), http://www.kurzweilai.net/the-law-of-accelerating-returns
[https://perma.cc/STX8-WFUB].
64. See Mary Madden, Public Perceptions of Privacy and Security in the PostSnowden Era, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/
2014/11/12/public-privacy-perceptions/
[https://perma.cc/Y4TL-UB7K].
65. See Alexander Tsesis, The Right to Erasure: Privacy, Data Brokers, and the
Indefinite Retention of Data, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 433, 435 (2014) (“While businesses
have legitimate reasons to use [customer] data in their day-to-day operations . . . [c]onsumeroriented legislation should prevent indiscriminate capitalization of data initially divulged for
specific transactions . . . .”).
66. See generally Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (holding government
collection of pen register information from a telephone company does not constitute a Fourth
Amendment search because a person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
information voluntarily furnished to a third party).
67. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J. concurring) (citing
Smith, 442 U.S. at 742; United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976)).
68. The Supreme Court will have an opportunity to revisit third-party doctrine in
Carpenter v. United States during its October 2017 Term. 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016), cert.
granted, 137 S. Ct. 2211 (June 5, 2017) (No. 16-402). In Carpenter, the FBI, without a
warrant, obtained robbery suspects’ historical-geolocational information derived from cell
phone-to-tower data transmissions, called cell-site-location information or CLSI. Id. at 88485. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question of whether the FBI’s conduct
constitutes a Fourth Amendment “search.”
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Debate over the “mosaic theory” of the Fourth Amendment69
might capture the distinction between the privacy interests of the
Fourth Amendment and those of the civil preserve. In traditional
Fourth Amendment analysis, courts analyze each act alleged to
be a search in isolation. 70 Each challenged act is either a Fourth
Amendment search or is not, and each search is either reasonable
or not. 71 However, under a mosaic theory, a series of government
acts of surveillance would be analyzed as a whole to determine
whether it reaches a tipping point that would trigger a reasonable
expectation of privacy and thus be deemed a search. 72
Orin Kerr criticizes the mosaic theory as a dramatic
departure from traditional Fourth Amendment doctrine, a
complication for lower courts to apply and implement in a
principled manner, and a disincentive to enact statutory privacy
regulations. 73 As D.C. Circuit Judge Sentelle put it in the Jones
run-up to the Supreme Court: “The sum of an infinite number of
zero-value parts is also zero.” 74 While Kerr’s critique may carry
the day as a Fourth Amendment matter, government information
mosaics could gravely imperil the civil preserve.

V. THE SURVEILLANCE DISTORTION EFFECT
From devout faith in an omniscient God 75 to the playful

69. See generally Kerr, supra note 17.
70. Id. at 315-16.
71. See id.
72. See id. at 313 (citing United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 n.* (D.C. Cir.
2010) (discussing how the court “analyz[ed] “police actions over time”).
73. See id. at 314-315.
74. United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766, 769 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Sentelle, C.J.,
dissenting).
75. All three major monotheistic religions embrace an all-knowing and watchful
conception of God. The Holy Bible contains numerous such verses. See, e.g., Job 34:21
(New American Standard) (“For His eyes are upon the ways of a man, And He sees all his
steps.”); Matthew 6:4 (New American Standard) (“[A]nd your Father who sees what is done
in secret will reward you.”); 1 Chronicles 28:9 (New American Standard) (“[F]or the Lord
searches all hearts, and understands every intent of the thoughts.”). The Hebrew Scriptures
informing the Jewish faith call the Lord the “God of knowledge” (El De’ot) in 1 Samuel 2:3
(New American Standard) and the “Lord Who Sees (“Adonai Yireh”) in Genesis 22:14 (Tree
of Life). In Islam, an Arabic moniker for God is “Al-’Aleem, the ‘“All-Knowing.’” See
Surah al-An’aam 6:59 (“And with Him are the keys of the unseen; none knows them except
Him. And He knows what is on the land and in the sea. Not a leaf falls but that He knows
it.”).
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childrearing benefit of an ever-watchful Santa Claus, 76 Western
societies have presumed that knowledge of observation affects the
behavior of the observed. Behavior is most acutely affected
where imminent consequences will flow from the observer’s
knowledge of the target’s disfavored conduct. Surveillance is
often designed to deter conduct by means of a direct nexus to
consequences. English philosopher Jeremy Bentham designed
the infamous Panopticon as a jailing facility calculated to regulate
inmate behavior by threat of surveillance and sanction. 77 Some
have argued that only the specific threat of retaliation creates a
chilling effect grounded in surveillance. 78
However, knowledge of observation, even where
consequences are more remote, can still have a distorting effect
on autonomy essential to civil society. Professor Krotoszynski
observed:
“The specter of ‘Big Brother’ watching will
undoubtedly have profound implications for the exercise of
expressive freedoms—indeed for the very idea of democracy
itself.” 79 Ubiquitous surveillance causes distortion effects that
could threaten the civil preserve. 80 It could chill expression,
research, and associations necessary to maintain popular
governance. 81 Surveillance could also adversely affect viewpoint
76. See JOHN FREDERICK COOTS & HAVEN GILLESPIE, SANTA CLAUS IS COMING TO
TOWN (1934) (“He sees you when you’re sleepin’; He knows when you’re awake; He knows
when you’ve been bad or good; So be good for goodness sake.”).
77. See generally Jeremy Bentham, Panopticon, or, The Inspection-House, in 4 THE
WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 37-172 (John Bowring ed., 1787). It was designed as a circle
by which numerous inmates could be seen by one jailer. While the jailer couldn’t monitor
all the inmates at once, the inmates could not observe the jailer’s attention. Therefore, the
chilling effect of potential surveillance generated penal efficiency. Bentham presented it as
“[a] new mode of obtaining power of mind over mind, in a quantity hitherto without example
. . . .” Id. at 39.
78. See Margot E. Kaminski & Shane Witnov, The Conforming Effect: First
Amendment Implications of Surveillance, Beyond Chilling Speech, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 465,
466 (2015) (noting that some commentators “evince skepticism over the effects of
surveillance, and suggest that chilling occurs only in response to specific threats of
retaliation”).
79. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Reconciling Privacy and Speech in the Era of Big
Data: A Comparative Legal Analysis, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1279, 1287 (2015) (footnote
omitted).
80. See Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934,
1935 (2013).
81. See id. (inviting us to “consider surveillance of people when they are thinking,
reading, and communicating with others in order to make up their minds about political and
social issues”). Richards goes on to suggest that information derived from surveillance may
be used to exert power through blackmail, manipulation, and discrimination. See id. at 1952-
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diversity by creating a conformity effect to a degree dangerous to
democratic governance. 82 Thus, there is a premium on ensuring
that the scope and intrusiveness of surveillance does not so
pervade society as to pierce the civil preserve.

VI. CYBERSURVEILLANCE IN THE DIGITAL AGE
In 1971, Justice Douglas declared: “Electronic surveillance
is the greatest leveler of human privacy ever known.” 83 That case
dealt with a motion-to-suppress and testimony by law
enforcement obtained by surreptitious radio transmissions and
eavesdropping of conversations between the defendant and a
government informant. 84 Modern cybersurveillance would be
unrecognizable to Justice Douglas in both sophistication and
prevalence.
More recently, Justice Sotomayor observed the magnitude of
change in her concurring opinion in United States v. Jones 85:
Awareness that the Government may be watching chills
associational and expressive freedoms.
And the
Government’s unrestrained power to assemble data that
reveal private aspects of identity is susceptible to abuse. The
net result is that GPS monitoring—by making available at a
relatively low cost such a substantial quantum of intimate
information about any person whom the Government, in its
unfettered discretion, chooses to track—may “alter the
relationship between citizen and government in a way that is
inimical to democratic society.” 86

She raises the specter of cybersurveillance as a threat that could
disrupt the relation between citizen and government.
58. The government or other actors may use surveillance-derived power to stifle healthy
political dissent. Id. at 1953.
82. See Kaminski & Witnov, supra note 78, at 467 (arguing that surveillance retards
the development of minority views and promotes conformity with majority views).
83. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 756 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
84. See id. at 746-47.
85. 565 U.S. 400, 413 (2012). There, the Court held that the warrantless attachment
and monitoring of a global positioning system (GPS) tracking device to a vehicle used by a
suspect violated the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 404. Justice Scalia’s majority opinion relied
on the physical intrusion of the device as the primary rationale, resurrecting the pre-Katz
Fourth Amendment doctrine grounded in trespass rather than a reasonable expectation of
privacy. See id. at 407-10.
86. Id. at 416 (Sotomayor, J. concurring) (quoting United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640
F.3d 272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011) (Flaum J., concurring)).
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Seismic changes threaten to shake democratic foundations.
Cybersurveillance increases as it becomes cheaper. 87 The cost of
data storage has fallen precipitously since the advent of
computers. 88 One analysis indicated that the digital storage space
that one can purchase per unit of cost has doubled roughly every
fourteen months between 1980 and 2009. 89 At the same time, the
storage capacity of individual devices has increased; the
maximum available disk size for a desktop computer has nearly
doubled every eighteen months since 1980. 90 Thus, governments
are increasingly able to inexpensively and efficiently store
information in bulk.
Another defining feature of the Digital Age is that
information is now a commodity to be sold and bartered. 91
Governments 92 and businesses 93 have entered the emergent Big
Data 94 markets. Companies collect massive amounts of data
87. See Drew F. Cohen, It Costs the Government Just 6.5 Cents an Hour to Spy on
You, POLITICO (Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/02/nsasurveillance-cheap-103335 [https://perma.cc/G8NV-Q4C3].
88. See BIG DATA AT WORK: THE DATA SCIENCE REVOLUTION AND
ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 160 (Scott Tonidandel, Eden B. King, & Jose M. Cortina
eds., 2015).
89. Matthew Komorowski, A History of Storage Cost, MKOMO.COM (Sept. 8, 2009),
http://www.mkomo.com/cost-per-gigabyte [https://perma.cc/4WQK-KQL7]; see also
Matthew Komorowski, A History of Storage Cost (Update), MKOMO.COM (Mar. 9, 2014),
http://www.mkomo.com/cost-per-gigabyte-update [https://perma.cc/YDR8-R4QE].
90. Richard Wright et al., The Significance of Storage in the “Cost of Risk” of Digital
Preservation, 4 INT’L J. DIGITAL CURATION 104, 105 (2009).
91. See THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INFORMATION 7-8 (Vincent Mosco & Janet
Wasko eds., 1988) (“[C]omputer-communication systems . . . measure and monitor
information transactions and permit the packaging and repackaging of information into a
marketable commodity.”).
92. See Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 143 (2000) (noting that Congress found that
many states sold personal information of motor-vehicle-license applicants as a commercial
product); JOHN PODESTA ET AL., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING
OPPORTUNITIES, PRESERVING VALUES 22-39 (2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov /sites
/default /files /docs /big_data_privacy_report_may_1_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/QB22CJXG] (outlining public sector management of data).
93. See Jason Morris & Ed Lavandera, Why Big Companies Buy, Sell Your Data, CNN
(Aug. 23, 2012, 3:52 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/23/tech/web/big-data-acxiom/
[https://perma.cc/VQ34-X72U] (noting that, by 2012, data sales was “a $300 billion-a-year
industry”); see also Building With Big Data, ECONOMIST (May 26, 2011),
http://www.economist.com/node/18741392 [https://perma.cc/76LQ-T28M].
94. Big Data includes “[e]xtremely large data sets that may be analyzed
computationally to reveal patterns, trends, and associations, especially relating to human
behavior and interactions.” See Big Data, OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARIES,
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/big_data [https://perma.cc/LM5X-RAR6]; see
also Elena Geanina Ularu et al., Perspectives on Big Data and Big Data Analytics, 3
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about current and potential customers. Also, political campaigns
collect massive amounts of information about voters in order to
persuade them and get them to the polls. 95 Many “free” services
and bargains for consumers come at the cost of granting
information provisions and permission to surveil. 96 There is a
vast commercial market for information and data integration. 97
There is a disorienting effect to the commodification of
information. Cybersurveillance captures intimate details of one’s
life in a physical time and place. 98 However, as it is integrated
into Big Data networks, the information becomes storable,
packagable, and transferable.
Cybersurveillance strips
information from the physical world and injects it into a virtual
one, decontextualized from human experience. In its amorphous
virtual form, data challenges many traditional legal paradigms
such as jurisdictional boundaries and international borders. 99
Most importantly, digital technology continues to transform
human behavior. In Riley v. California, 100 the Supreme Court
invalidated a warrantless search of cell phone data incident to an
arrest as a violation of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on
unreasonable searches and seizures. 101 Chief Justice John
Roberts, on behalf of the eight-justice majority, noted that mobile
phones “are now such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life
that the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they were

DATABASE SYS. J. 3, 4 (2012) (outlining IBM’s four aspects of Big Data as volume, velocity,
variety, and veracity).
95. See David W. Nickerson & Todd Rogers, Political Campaigns and Big Data, 28
J. ECON. PERSP. 51, 51 (2014) (noting that since 2008 “campaigns have become increasingly
reliant on analyzing large and detailed datasets”).
96. See Joseph W. Jerome, Buying and Selling Privacy: Big Data’s Different Burdens
and Benefits, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 47, 48 (2013) (citation omitted) (referencing a study
that indicated “free internet services offer $2,600 in value . . . in exchange for [user] data”).
97. PODESTA ET AL., supra note 92, at 43-47 (discussing the data-services sector of
the economy).
98. See Steven I. Friedland, I Spy: Self-Cybersurveillance and the “Internet of
Things”, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1459, 1461 (2015) (citation omitted) (noting that
cybertechnology “generate[s] personal, even intimate information”).
99. See Jennifer Daskal, The Un-Territoriality of Data, 125 YALE L.J. 326, 330 (2015)
(“These unique features of data raise important questions about which ‘here’ and ‘there’
matter; they call into question the normative significance of longstanding distinctions
between what is territorial and what is extraterritorial. Put bluntly, data is destabilizing
territoriality doctrine.”).
100. 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
101. Id. at 2494-95 (referencing U.S. CONST. amend. IV.).
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an important feature of human anatomy.” 102
catalogued the marvel of the modern cell phone:

The opinion

The term ‘cell phone’ is itself misleading shorthand; many
of these devices are in fact minicomputers that also happen
to have the capacity to be used as a telephone. They could
just as easily be called cameras, video players, rolodexes,
calendars, tape recorders, libraries, diaries, albums,
televisions, maps, or newspapers. One of the most notable
distinguishing features of modern cell phones is their
immense storage capacity. 103

These devices record our physical movements, our entertainment
preferences, our access to information from the Internet, our
associational behavior, and our communications across numerous
digital platforms.
In addition, people are buying more and more services
Digital platforms provide ready access to
online. 104
entertainment, gifts, clothing, transportation, real estate,
groceries, education, navigation, and service calls. Digital
footprints increasingly betray an individual’s public and
nonpublic political, religious, and intimate activity. All of this
information can be the subject of cybersurveillance. And much
of it already is.
Government cybersurveillance comes in different forms.
The government’s ability to observe citizen data ranges from bulk
data collection to an individually targeted collection. 105 There is
also a distinction between collection and review. The government
may collect data in bulk, store it, and then only search it as
particular interests arise.
The government may also surveil directly or indirectly. 106 A
102. Id. at 2484.
103. Id. at 2489.
104. See Ruth Mantell, E-Commerce Speeds Up, Hits Record High Share of Retail
Sales, MARKETWATCH (Aug. 15, 2014, 1:45 PM), http://blogs.marketwatch.com
/capitolreport /2014 /08 /15 /e-commerce-speeds-up-hits-record-high-share-of-retail-sales/
[https://perma.cc/4NEZ-WT9X] (charting the significant growth in e-commerce sales from
2000 to 2014).
105. See RHODRI JEFFREYS-JONES, WE KNOW ALL ABOUT YOU: THE STORY OF
SURVEILLANCE IN BRITAIN AND AMERICA 223 (2017) (outlining a recommendation that
government interception of information in counterterrorism investigations, “both individual
and bulk,” should be subject to judicially approved warrants).
106. Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law After the USA Patriot Act: The Big
Brother That Isn’t, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 607, 621 (2003).
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warrant to collect a suspect’s email correspondence is a classic
example of direct government cybersurveillance. 107 Indirect
government cybersurveillance refers to government collection of
data provided by target individuals to third parties, usually in the
context of commercial transactions. 108 The Fourth Amendment
third-party doctrine 109 transforms commercially motivated data
collection into storage for indirect government cybersurveillance.
Therefore, all cybersurveillance—information collected due to
government coercion, government observation, commercial
interest, or customer convenience—becomes the potential subject
of government cybersurveillance.
There is also an important nexus between cybersurveillance
and cybersecurity. Both public and private sector Big Data
cybersurveillance fruits become vulnerable to cybersecurity
threats from hostile governments, 110 criminal elements, 111 or
hacktivists. 112
Cybersecurity’s potential failure to secure
sensitive personal information held by the government presents
an additional threat to the civil preserve.

107. See id.
108. Id. (“[I]ndirect government surveillance rules authorize the government to
compel providers to conduct surveillance on the government’s behalf.”).
109. See supra Part IV.
110. Russian state interference operations designed to tilt the U.S. presidential election
in favor of Donald Trump roiled American politics well beyond 2016. See NAT’ L
INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ASSESSMENT: ASSESSING RUSSIAN
ACTIVITIES AND INTENTIONS IN RECENT US ELECTIONS
ii
(2017),
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf [https://perma.cc/RS4K-PJMG]. I
am also among some 22 million people whose U.S. national security clearance
documentation, including fingerprint images, was stolen by Chinese hackers. See Joe
Davidson, One Year After OPM Cybertheft Hit 22 Million: Are You Safer Now?, WASH.
POST (June 8, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2016/06/08/on
e-year-after-opm-cybertheft-hit-22-million-are-you-safer-now/?utm_term=.c8b656ea8482
[https://perma.cc/UV4G-64MJ].
111. See FINKLEA & THEOHARY, supra note 10, Summary (“Twenty-first century
criminals increasingly rely on the Internet and advanced technologies to further their criminal
operations . . . . [T]hey exploit the digital world to facilitate crimes that are often technology
driven, including identity theft, payment card fraud, and intellectual property theft.”); see
also Tony Bradley, Cybercrime is the Modern-Day Mafia, FORBES (Oct. 16, 2015, 10:38
AM), https://www.forbes.com /sites /tonybradley /2015 /10/16/cybercrime-is-the-modernday-mafia/#6b9f778e4539 [https://perma.cc/Q9E7-S8TR].
112. See Wendy H. Wong & Peter A. Brown, E-Bandits in Global Activism:
WikiLeaks, Anonymous, and the Politics of No One, 11 PERSP. ON POL. 1015, 1015 (2013)
(describing “a new kind of political actor” who “engage[s] in the politics of no one via
anonymizing Internet technologies” by means of hacking systems, stealing data, and
disrupting systems).
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VII. TATTOO SURVEILLANCE AND THE THREAT
TO THE CIVIL PRESERVE
Take, for example, tattoos. Tattoos are a widespread,
ancient medium of human expression that dates back at least
5,000 years. 113 By one estimate, between seven and twenty
million Americans have tattoos. 114 They can signal all manners
of identity—frivolous, amorous, ironic, artistic, sacred, patriotic,
political, memorial, associational, ascriptive, dissenting,
nonconformist, racist, or criminal.
Law enforcement has a number of legitimate interests in
tattoos.
Tattoos can play a critical role in witness
identification. 115 Tattoos are also an integral part of law
enforcement’s anti-gang tactics. 116 Gang-identification training
based on tattoo analysis helps to identify threats to the safety of
inmates, officers, and staff of correctional facilities. 117
The Federal Bureau of Investigation has engaged the
National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) to

113. See Christina Smith, 21st Century Tattoo Identification and Information Sharing
Thesis 5 (Jan. 5, 2015) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Bridgewater State University) (on file with
the College of Graduate Studies, Bridgewater State University).
114. George B. Palermo, The Skin and Freedom of Speech, 55 INT’L J. OFFENDER
THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 507, 507-508 (2011).
115. See, e.g., State v. Gallegos, 853 P.2d 160, 161 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993) (holding
that it was an error for the trial court to exclude a photo array of the defendant’s brother’s
tattoos as part of his defense of mistaken identification); Commonwealth v. Crork, 966 A.2d
585, 586 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009) (noting that a witness identified a suspect based on a single
photo of the defendant’s tattoo—the same tattoo the witness’ saw on the robber’s arm); see
also HU HAN & ANIL K. JAIN, TATTOO BASED IDENTIFICATION: SKETCH TO IMAGE
MATCHING 1-2 (2013) (citation omitted) (noting that tattoos’ use in law enforcement
agencies has grown due to their “prevalence among the criminal section of the population
and their saliency in visual attention”).
116. See JOHN ANDERSON ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GANG PROSECUTION
MANUAL 5 (2009) (“[G]ang unit investigators (experts) must have hands-on street
knowledge of jurisdictional gangs and must develop and maintain up-to-date gang records
in the form of field interview cards, police reports, probation and parole records, court
adjudications of prosecutorial efforts, and cataloged photographs of gang members, tattoos,
and graffiti.” (emphasis added)); see also id. at 9 (recommending that gang files should
“include photos of gang graffiti and its location; examples of various names and symbols
used to identify the gang; [and] photos of the various tattoos worn by individual members
affiliated with the gang” (emphasis added)).
117. See Thomas R. Zackasee, Prison Gang Tattoo Recognition: A Correctional
Officer’s Survival Guide 1 (Dec. 2004) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Youngstown State
University), http:// docshare04 .docshare. tips /files /6289 /62890056 .pdf
[https://perma.cc/EM5X-T5PT]’.
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develop sophisticated tattoo-recognition technology. 118 Like
other biometric technology, 119 law enforcement and
counterterrorism officials will be able to identify people based on
physical characteristics of tattoos. 120 Similarly, by using other
mobile scanning technologies, 121 the government will be able to
integrate tattoo scanners with car mounts, pole cameras, drone
cameras, and body cameras. 122
According to the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the project
seeks to go beyond use of tattoos as an identifying feature to also
“map connections between people with similarly themed tattoos
or make inferences about people from their tattoos (e.g. political
ideology, religious beliefs).” 123 On one hand, such analysis assists
in identifying gang affiliations. On the other hand, such analysis
is vulnerable to false positives, racial profiling, and stereotyping.
A government analysis of political ideology or religious
beliefs of people bearing tattoos should give significant pause,
even at a particularized, retail level. However, a proliferation of
118. Aaron Mackey & Dave Maass, Tattoo Recognition Research Threatens Free
Speech and Privacy, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (June 2, 2016),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/06/tattoo-recognition-research-threatens-free-speechand-privacy [https://perma.cc/5GTJ-6VEW]. .
119. Other examples include facial recognition, digital fingerprinting, and iris scans.
See id.
120. Id.
121. See ELSAG, 5 INDISPENSABLE WAYS AN ALPR SYSTEM REDUCES VEHICLERELATED CRIMES (2017), https://cdn2.hubspot.net /hubfs /2464672 /gated-downloads
/5_Indispensable_Ways.pdf— [https://perma.cc/QHR5-343Z]. Law enforcement agencies
commonly use these readers for traffic and parking management, tollbooth operations, access
control, and criminal investigations. See id. “ALPR cameras can capture up to 900 plates
per minute . . . .” Id. Some proposed uses have generated public outcry. See, e.g., Dash
Coleman, Tybee Island Abandons License Plate Scanner Plans, SAVANNAH MORNING
NEWS (Dec. 3, 2013, 1:43 PM), http://savannahnow.com /news/2013-12-02/tybee-islandabandons-license-plate-scanner-plans [https://perma.cc/G5XU-GZC3]. However, they are
widely used and have been highly productive. See Mike Blake, New Police Tech Has Cops
Scanning License Plates to Trace Criminals, REUTERS, June 27, 2015, https:// www.rt.com
/usa / 270055- police- license- plate -scanning-criminals/ [https://perma.cc/W6KD-BS24]
(noting that over a two-month period, Denver police analyzed 835,000 license-plate images
leading to 17,000 hits for warrants, stolen vehicles, and other investigative leads).
122. The proliferation of these modes of camera surveillance threatens the civil
preserve. See, e.g., M. Ryan Calo, The Drone as Privacy Catalyst, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE
29, 29 (2011) (describing drones’ threat to privacy as “just the visceral jolt society needs to
drag privacy law into the twenty-first century”); Mary D. Fan, Privacy, Public Disclosure,
Police Body Cameras: Policy Splits, 68 ALA. L. REV. 395, 397, 399 (2016) (discussing
privacy issues related to vantage points of police body cameras that includes victims,
witnesses, suspects, and private enclaves).
123. Mackey & Maass, supra note 118.
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mobile and stationary tattoo readers could quickly become a
wholesale exercise. Big Data, government public surveillance,
image storage, and algorithmic classification of tattooed people
all implicate the civil preserve. 124
However, existing
constitutional law likely provides no regulation of a tattoorecognition program.
Tattoos are publicly visible to the extent not covered by
clothing. Under traditional Fourth Amendment analysis, people
would not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in tattoos
visible to the public. 125 No individual collection by the officer or
camera’s observation of that which the person exposed to the
public would constitute a “search” under Katz. Presuming tattoo
scanners deployed on car mounts, poles, and officers are in public
places, or capture images in plain view scenarios, the government
would not engage in any physical intrusion that would trigger the
trespass rationale established in Jones. In effect, a tattoorecognition program would not be subjected to any meaningful
Fourth Amendment regulation.
Two less established Fourth Amendment theories could
potentially capture a challenge to a Big Data tattoo-recognition
program. First, a mosaic theory approach to reasonableness could
potentially establish constitutional limits on tattoo recognition.
Second, there have been some cases in which the courts have
suggested that technologies that transcend human sensory
capacity may constitute a “search” where human vision, hearing,
or smell might not. For example, in Kyllo v. United States, 126 the
Court held that thermal imaging technology used to assess the
heat in a private home constitutes a Fourth Amendment search,
notwithstanding Justice Stevens’s dissenting observation that
“ordinary use of the senses might enable a neighbor or passerby
to notice the heat emanating from [the] building.” 127 Similar logic
124. Algorithms may perpetuate discriminatory patterns embedded in a historical
dataset, and the inferential logic in their code may create new disparities that offend values
of equal protection, religious freedom, or free expression. See Anupam Chander, The Racist
Algorithm?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1023, 1036 (2017). Poorly designed algorithms may
generate faulty data-based inferences of guilt that lead to adverse consequences. See
Margaret Hu, Big Data Blacklisting, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1735, 1759 (2015) (“Big data programs
may facilitate a presumption of guilt . . . .”
125. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (citing Lewis v. United States,
385 U.S. 206, 210 (1966)); United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927)).
126. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
127. Id. at 43 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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informed the analysis in Jones and the holding that GPS tracking
of a vehicle on a public roadway that could have been surveilled
by a human team nonetheless constituted a search. 128 If the Court
emphasized the inhumanness of Big Data analysis in determining
the reach of the Fourth Amendment, its doctrine might expand to
reach cybersurveillance efforts like a tattoo-recognition program.
I am quite comfortable with the existence of a civil preserve
that is presupposed by the American system. I am also
comfortable with the notion that it is a constitutional value that
should enjoy constitutional protections. At present, however, I
am not comfortable with a translation of those two premises into
constitutional legal doctrine or practice without a set of standards
that lend themselves to principled application. The concepts are
too amorphous for judicial operation and therefore too susceptible
to judicial overreach. Therefore, there is more work to be done
to establish the contours and limits of the civil preserve in any
effort to establish workable constitutional safeguards to protect it.
For the time being, we are left to apply existing constitutional law
and seek to pass legislation addressing the unique threats posed
to the civil preserve by the technological revolution.

VIII. CONCLUSION
In sum, this is an essay about stakes. A surveilled public is
a chilled public. Its independence from government and the
market becomes compromised with each collection. Civil society
theory explains why government cybersurveillance in the Digital
Age presents profound challenges to the system.
We are going to see more and more situations in which
courts and policy makers struggle to apply constitutional
principles across technological platforms—Xfinity, Netflix,
FitBit, OnStar, Garmin, Apple Watch, Rite Aid Wellness Plus,
and the Internet of Things—that interact with our daily personal
lives. These thorny cybersurveillance issues will cut across
traditional criminal investigations as well as counterterrorism
investigations. Preservation of civil society must be the lodestar
in delimiting modern cybersurveillance.

128. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012).

